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 17 three aPProaches to  handling the  
covid-19 crisis in federal coUntries
 Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
Thomas Czypionka and Miriam Reiss
Despite their geo graph i cal and cultural proximity, Germany, Austria, 
and Switzerland can teach very dif er ent lessons on how to  handle the COVID-19 
pandemic. Timing and severity of outbreaks  were fairly similar in Germany and 
Austria (see Figures 17.1 through 17.3), whereas Switzerland faced a higher infec-
tion rate at the peak of the crisis (although far from rates in France or Italy). 
Response mea sures eventually taken by the three countries  were not too dif er-
ent,  either, but how decisions  were made and subsequently communicated to the 
public varied considerably.
In all three countries, containment mea sures  were met by a high level of 
adherence within the population, as mobility indices illustrate (see Figures  17.1 
through 17.3). As a result, the three countries fared well in reducing transmission 
rates and never came close to reaching capacity limits in their health systems. This 
chapter aims to examine the outbreak responses of the three countries and give 
insight into the dynamics and rationales  behind  these responses.
Health Policy Mea sures
Although Germany had its first case of SARS- CoV-2 confirmed as early as Janu-
ary  27, 2020, in Bavaria (a man who contracted the virus from a Chinese col-
league), official case numbers increased at a rather slow pace in the subsequent 
weeks and  were still below one hundred by the end of February. Hence, public 
health mea sures at that time  were essentially  limited to testing, contact trac-
ing, and isolation of confirmed and potential cases, as well as communication 
of recommendations regarding hygiene and  physical distancing. In early March, 
however, the identification of multiple clusters across the country (Robert Koch 
Institute, 2020b) led to growing public awareness and triggered the gradual intro-
duction of containment mea sures.
Although some recommendations  were issued by the federal government 
(“Spahn Empfiehlt Absage” [“Spahn Recommends Cancellation”], 2020), early 
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Figure 17.1. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and change  
of mobility in Germany.
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Figure 17.2. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and change  
of mobility in Austria.
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Figure 17.3. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and  
change of mobility in Switzerland.
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policy responses  were mostly on the state level as they hold the legislative and 
executive competences in case of a pandemic (Robert Koch Institute, 2020c). 
Bavaria and North Rhine- Westphalia, where some of the first clusters emerged, 
 were the first states to ban events with more than one thousand participants 
on March  10, 2020 (“Bayern Untersagt Wegen Corona Großveranstaltungen” 
[“Bavaria Bans Major Events  Because of Coronavirus”], 2020; State Government 
of North Rhine- Westphalia, 2020). In the following days, the majority of states 
de cided to close schools and nurseries (“Nachbarn Schliessen Grenzen” [“Neigh-
bors Close Borders”], 2020). Increasingly, regional diferences in essential restric-
tions of daily life and businesses led to considerable public dissatisfaction and 
calls for more centrally aligned interventions (Welty, 2020). Bavaria in par tic u lar 
pressed ahead with restrictive mea sures such as stay- at- home  orders (“Katastro-
phenfall” [Emergencies], 2020).
Coordinated action on the federal level was eventually taken on March  16, 
2020, when Chancellor Angela Merkel announced containment mea sures for the 
entire country agreed upon by the federal and state governments.  These mea-
sures included closure of nonessential shops and sports facilities, school closures, 
and restrictions for restaurants (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). Furthermore, 
borders with Austria, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Switzerland  were shut 
down (“Kampf Gegen Coronavirus” [“Fight against the Coronavirus”], 2020). Con-
sidering the exponential growth path of case numbers, RKI— Germany’s federal 
scientific institution in the field of biomedicine— raised the epidemic risk level 
to “high” on March 17, 2020 (Robert Koch Institute, 2020b). As Eu ro pean Union 
(EU) leaders de cided on a thirty- day entry ban for non- EU citizens, Germany also 
widened its travel restrictions to EU citizens from countries classified as high- risk 
areas (“Deutschland,” 2020).
A further notable tightening of lockdown mea sures followed on March  22, 
2020, when the federal government and the sixteen state governments agreed to 
ban gatherings of more than two  people and to mandate a minimum distance of 
1.5 meters in public with the exception of families, partners, and persons living in 
the same  house hold. Residents  were only allowed to leave their homes for work, 
basic errands, helping  others, and exercising. The agreement also included the 
closure of all restaurants and personal ser vice facilities, allowing individual states 
to impose further restrictions (Federal Government of Germany, 2020a).
Within the health system, ser vice provision was reor ga nized to safeguard 
sufficient capacities for management of the pandemic. From mid- March, hos-
pitals  were ordered to postpone elective surgeries and nonurgent treatments, 
while specialized treatment centers for COVID-19 patients as well as an inten-
sive care registry  were set up (“Corona: Krankenhaeuser” [“Corona: Hospitals”], 
2020; Robert Koch Institute, 2020a). In parallel, restrictions on video consulta-
tions and telemedicine in outpatient practice  were relaxed, and physicians  were 
granted a temporary provision to issue or renew prescriptions, referrals, and sick 
notes digitally or via telephone (“COVID-19,” 2020). As in many other countries, 
 there  were shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the early phase 
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of the pandemic.  These  were particularly severe in general prac ti tion ers’ (GP) 
offices, but supplies  were also insufficient in hospitals and long- term care facili-
ties; this led to reusing disposable masks. In response, the procurement of PPE 
was transferred from the states to the central level and handled by the Ministry 
of Health from early March onward. In addition, Germany prohibited exports of 
PPE, which led to tensions with other Eu ro pean countries (see  later in this chap-
ter) and was  later partially revoked (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). What is 
more, production capacities (e.g., in the textile industry)  were soon repurposed 
to producing masks and respirators.
Testing volumes have been comparatively high in Germany from the begin-
ning of the crisis and  were continuously increased (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 
2020). Access to testing kits was facilitated by the fact that the first polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) test for SARS- CoV-2 was developed by the German Cen-
ter for Infection Research at Charité Berlin (Charité— Universitaetsmedizin 
Berlin, 2020). Public and private laboratories  were quickly mobilized to increase 
testing capacities.  Because testing is rather decentralized and performed at 
vari ous types of health facilities, data on test numbers are merged only once a 
week at RKI.
In the face of a sharp decline in daily new infections, lockdown mea sures 
 were gradually relaxed beginning April 20, 2020. From April 17, 2020, onward, 
the majority of states introduced some form of mandatory use of face masks with 
regulation relaxations, but specific regulations varied by state (Winkelmann & 
Reichebner, 2020).
Although the introduction of restrictions had to some extent been coordi-
nated on the federal level, exit from lockdown was again mostly guided by the 
individual states. This can be considered a re- shift to common prepandemic pol-
icy, in which federal states  were considered to hold the decision mandate (Schlette 
et al., 2020). In light of the debate on constitutionality, legality, and proportional-
ity of the restrictions that had been imposed, discussions about mea sure appro-
priateness and noncoordinated action continued throughout May and June 2020. 
From the standpoint of demo cratic politics, it was clear that with the acute phase 
of the crisis abating, imposing new restrictions or extending restrictions had to 
be justified more rigorously, whereas relaxation had to be the norm (“Merkel zur 
Corona- Krise” [“Merkel about Coronacrisis”], 2020; Papier, 2020).
Austria had its first two cases of SARS- CoV-2 confirmed on February 25, 2020 
(a young  couple that had recently been to Lombardy), four weeks  later than Ger-
many’s first case. In early March 2020, however, it became apparent that a major 
infection cluster had been active in the Tyrolean ski resort town of Ischgl from 
late February onward.  Because of the late detection of the hotspot and delayed 
action from regional authorities, the virus was then carried to other countries 
(mostly Germany and Nordic countries) and regions by returning tourists who 
had contracted it in Ischgl.
On March 10, 2020, the Austrian federal government announced that events 
with more than five hundred participants would be banned and that universities 
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and upper secondary schools would have to switch to distance learning (“Corona-
virus: Starke Einschraenkungen Beschlossen” [“Coronavirus: Severe Restrictions 
 Adopted”], 2020; Tritschler, 2020). The latter was then extended to all schools; 
primary and lower secondary schools, however, stayed open for supervision 
where  children could not be looked  after privately (Peitler- Hasewend & Jung-
wirth, 2020).
Continuously increasing case numbers and alarming footage from neighbor-
ing northern Italy led the government to announce far stricter lockdown mea-
sures only few days  later, on March  13, 2020. The Austrian regulations, which 
 later served as a model for the German mea sures, included shelter- in- place  orders 
with few exceptions, a mandatory 1- meter distance to non house hold members 
and closures of restaurants and nonessential retail. On the same day, in addition 
to travel warnings and flight bans for several high- risk countries, Austria closed 
its borders to Italy almost entirely. Furthermore, some severely afected munici-
palities (including Ischgl)  were put  under curfew (“Ausgangsbeschraenkungen” 
[“Curfew”], 2020; “Austria’s Tyrol Province  Orders Lockdown,” 2020).
On March 30, 2020, additional restrictions  were announced, most notably the 
requirement to wear face masks in stores (and  later also in public transport) (Habi-
mana et al., 2020). Austria was among the first countries in Eu rope to introduce the 
mandatory use of face masks. Furthermore, companies  were obligated to enable 
employees belonging to risk groups to work from home. Accompanying this regu-
lation, a salary replacement scheme for reimbursement of employers’ costs was 
introduced (“Maskenpflicht” [“Mandatory Face Masks”], 2020; Parliament of the 
Republic of Austria, 2020).
As in Germany, hospitals in Austria  were called upon to postpone all nonur-
gent surgeries and examinations (“Operationen Verschieben Statt Risiken Einge-
hen” [“Postpone Operations Instead of Taking Risks”], 2020). Specific hospitals 
or hospital units across the country  were designated for treatment of COVID-19 
patients (“59 Spitaeler” [“59 Hospitals”], 2020). Physicians  were enabled to issue 
prescriptions electronically, sick notes via telephone, and teleconsultations in psy-
chotherapy  were made reimbursable by health insurance funds (“OEGK,” 2020). 
Procurement and distribution of PPE  were coordinated by the Ministry of Health 
from early March 2020 onward. Controversy arose when shipments of PPE des-
tined for Austria  were held back at the German border  because of the export ban 
while the health and long- term care sectors began to run short of supplies (“Lkw 
Mit Schutzmasken” [“Trucks with Face Masks”], 2020). The issue was resolved in 
mid- March at the EU level when a joint procurement by the EU Commission and 
export restrictions to non- EU member states was agreed upon (Repre sen ta tion of 
the Eu ro pean Commission in Germany, 2020).
Testing of suspected cases was initiated  either by a call to the helpline 1450 or 
by a GP (Federal Ministry of Social Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protec-
tion, 2020b). Testing volumes  were ramped up  after increasing criticism that the 
available capacities  were not being used optimally. The target of fifteen thousand 
tests per day as communicated by the government has, however, not been reached 
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as of this writing (“Coronavirus: Das ‘Nadeloehr’ bei den Testungen” [“Coronavi-
rus: The ‘Eye of the Needle’ in Testing”], 2020). When daily new cases began to 
decline, freed-up capacities  were partly used for targeted testing of healthcare 
professionals, residents of nursing homes, and persons working in critical infra-
structure (“Coronavirus: Gezielte Tests,” 2020). Although  there is a uniform defi-
nition of testing criteria,  actual practice varies by state (Federal Ministry of Social 
Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2020b).
The favorable development of infection rates allowed Austria to begin lifting 
some lockdown mea sures as early as mid- April 2020 (“Coronavirus: Fahrplan,” 
2020). Starting with opening shops and restaurants and followed by resumption 
of classroom teaching in schools, mea sures  were relaxed mostly at two- week 
intervals to allow for monitoring efects on the epidemiological development and 
to potentially reassess the strategy (“Coronavirus: Ausgangsbeschraenkungen 
Laufen Aus” [“Coronavirus: Curfew Expires”], 2020). In late July, the health min-
ister announced the introduction of a traffic- light system that would determine 
the requirement for a regional re introduction of containment mea sures based on 
a set of indicators.  These indicators include epidemiological mea sures as well as 
regionally available resources (Gaigg & Mueller, 2020).
In Switzerland, the first case of SARS- CoV-2 (a seventy- year- old man who had 
recently visited Milan) was confirmed on the same day as in Austria (i.e., Febru-
ary 25, 2020). Only three days  later, Switzerland was among the first countries in 
Eu rope to impose containment mea sures as the Federal Council banned events 
with more than one thousand participants (Federal Council, 2020c).
Case numbers continued to rise fast in early March— significantly faster than 
in Germany or Austria at that time— especially in urban areas (Trein & Rodwin 
Wagner, 2020). The ban of events was extended to events with more than one 
hundred  people on March  13, 2020, and classroom teaching was suspended in 
schools and universities, while childcare facilities had to remain open for  children 
where parental supervision was not pos si ble (Federal Council, 2020a).
In the face of continuously increasing case numbers, the Federal Council 
declared the “extraordinary situation” on March  16, 2020, which allowed them 
to uniformly impose containment mea sures across all cantons. Like in the other 
countries, restaurants and nonessential shops had to close. In addition, border 
checks  were introduced and entry bans imposed. Besides transit and goods traffic, 
only Swiss citizens, persons holding a residence permit, and persons working in 
Switzerland  were allowed to enter the country (Federal Council, 2020d; Mantwill 
et al., 2020).
Further physical distancing regulations  were announced by the Federal Coun-
cil on March 20, 2020,  after the number of daily new cases had risen to more than 
fourteen hundred (S. Buehler et al., 2020). Gatherings of more than five persons 
 were banned and a distance of 2 meters between persons not living in the same 
 house hold was mandated. Although the industry and construction sectors  were 
allowed to continue operating, they  were required to follow strict regulations 
regarding hygiene and physical distancing. In case they did not comply, cantons 
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 were allowed to close down individual companies (Federal Council, 2020b). This 
was  later extended by the possibility to shut down  whole sectors on canton level if 
deemed necessary (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020d).
A notable mea sure related to the health system was the authorization of can-
tons to oblige private hospitals to  free capacities for the treatment of COVID-19 
patients (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020f). All hospitals  were prohibited 
from performing nonurgent procedures and examinations. Furthermore, the dec-
laration of the extraordinary situation allowed to mobilize up to eight thousand 
armed forces to assist with healthcare logistics and security (Federal Council, 
2020d). Switzerland also faced a shortage of PPE at the outbreak of the crisis, 
which led to criticism of the authorities for taking action too late (see  later in 
this chapter). As Switzerland, unlike Germany, does not produce much protective 
gear, it had been heavi ly reliant on imports. As a result, tensions arose between 
Switzerland and Germany when shipments of PPE headed to Switzerland  were 
temporarily detained at the German border, as it was  later also the case with Aus-
tria (“Mask Hysteria,” 2020). In April, Switzerland began to produce protective 
masks (“Coronavirus: Switzerland,” 2020).
Testing volumes had been relatively high in Switzerland, albeit not as high 
as in Germany. Criteria for testing  were defined on the national level and had 
been evolving in the course of the crisis. The  actual administration and proce-
dure of testing fell, however, within the responsibility of the individual cantons. 
They determined  whether tests  were to be performed in designated hospitals, at 
GP practices, or by mobile teams (Mantwill et al., 2020). By June 2020, the fed-
eral government agreed to assume the total costs for all PCR and antibody tests 
performed. Before that, the costs  were split between health insurers and cantons 
(Federal Office of Public Health, 2020c).
Switzerland began easing restrictions on April 27, 2020, when hardware stores, 
hairdressers, and other personal ser vice providers  were allowed to reopen and 
elective medical treatments could be performed again. From mid- May, res-
taurants and shops  were opened and classroom teaching in schools gradually 
resumed (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020b).
The rather coordinated manner of economic reopening throughout May 
was  later met with challenges,  because the Federal Council withdrew from the 
extraordinary situation and dissolved its crisis unit on June  19, 2020 (Federal 
Office of Public Health, 2020e). From that point onward, the Federal Council pub-
licly stressed its withdrawal from extraordinary exertion of power and the prime 
responsibility of cantons to manage a renewed increase in infections (Federal 
Office of Public Health, 2020e). In the light of slightly increasing case numbers 
and the occurrence of super- spreader events, this coordinated action proved chal-
lenging on questions such as mask regulations in cross- canton public transports 
or coordinated contact- tracing strategies (U. Buehler, Mueller, & Fritzsche, 2020).
 Because Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are so closely interconnected in 
both economic and cultural terms, cross- country travel and transit has been a highly 
relevant aspect during the crisis. The three countries belong to the Schengen area 
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and therefore normally do not apply any border controls. However, all three coun-
tries closed their borders in March 2020, and entry was only granted to foreign 
citizens  under certain exceptions.  These exceptions included (essential) work, 
transit, and goods traffic. In mid- May 2020, the first easing of entry restrictions 
between Austria, Germany, and Switzerland was announced. Exceptions to the 
entry ban  were extended to also include visits of partners or relatives, impor tant 
 family occasions, care for animals, or maintenance of property (Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020). As of June 15, 2020,  there  were no 
more border controls between the three countries.
Social Policy Mea sures
As of this writing, the German federal government issued two major economic 
relief packages: the first of EUR 156 billion (approximately 4.9  percent of the gross 
domestic product, GDP) from mid- March and the second of EUR 130 billion 
(approximately 4.0  percent of GDP) in late June (International Monetary Fund, 
2020). The packages comprise a broad range of mea sures aimed at stimulating the 
economy, supporting businesses, protecting jobs, and mitigating the efects of the 
crisis on socially deprived groups.
Short- time work (Kurzarbeit) benefits, which Germany already heavi ly relied 
on during and  after the financial crisis of 2008,  were introduced as part of the 
first package. Benefits have since been increased and extended multiple times and 
access has been eased. The plan allows for benefits of up to 80  percent of former 
net income, with even higher benefits for workers with  children (International 
 Labour Organ ization, 2020b).
Access to basic income support for the unemployed was eased, and unem-
ployment benefits  were partially extended. To support families, they received a 
one- time “ family bonus” of EUR 300 per child and increased parental- leave ben-
efits, while access to childcare benefits for low- income families was eased (Inter-
national  Labour Organ ization, 2020b). Single parents  were granted additional tax 
allowances (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2020). In the field of housing, a rental 
protection act was enacted that temporarily prevented lessors from terminating 
rental agreements  because of outstanding rent payments (“What’s in Germany’s 
Emergency Coronavirus Bud get?,” 2020).
Self- employed workers and small businesses could apply for a one- time emer-
gency aid if they  were heavi ly afected by the crisis (Arbeitsagentur, 2020). Credit 
guarantees  were granted, and companies expecting losses for 2020 may clear 
 these with tax prepayments they have already paid for 2019. Furthermore, several 
tax reliefs  were granted, including moratoriums on tax debts, adjusted prepay-
ments, and suspensions of sequestrations (International  Labour Organ ization, 
2020b). VAT rates  were temporarily reduced from 19  percent to 16  percent and 
from 7  percent to 5  percent, respectively (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2020). Sup-
port packages specifically for start- ups and artists also  were set up. In addition to 
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 these federal- level mea sures, many states individually passed further relief pack-
ages (Federal Government of Germany, 2020b).
In Austria, a crisis management fund amounting to EUR 4 billion was issued 
on March 15, 2020, but the fiscal package has since been extended to a total of 
EUR 50 billion (approximately 9.5  percent of GDP) (International Monetary Fund, 
2020). The bud geted mea sures are similar to the ones taken in Germany.
The central mea sure taken in the field of the  labor market was the short- time 
working scheme specifically developed for the COVID-19 crisis. As in Germany, 
the scheme was extended several times. It allowed working hours to be reduced to 
a minimum of 10  percent at 80  percent to 90  percent of regular pay (International 
 Labour Organ ization, 2020a). An adapted short- time working scheme in force 
from October onward involved training opportunities for workers with reduced 
hours (Reisner, 2020).
The unemployed received a one- time additional benefit of EUR 450, and access 
to several other social benefits was eased (“Arbeitslosengeld” [“Unemployment 
Benefit”], 2020; “Austria Plans Coronavirus Help,” 2020). Families in need could 
apply for a benefit of up to EUR 1,200 per month for a maximum of three months 
from the so- called Corona  Family Hardship Fund (Federal Ministry of  Labour, 
 Family and Youth, 2020a). Furthermore, workers with care responsibilities can get 
additional paid leave of up to three weeks (Federal Ministry of  Labour,  Family and 
Youth, 2020b).
Support for businesses includes a so- called “hardship fund” that grants one- 
time cash payments to individual entrepreneurs and small businesses afected by 
the crisis (International  Labour Organ ization, 2020a). Another fund covers guar-
antees for loans and subsidies for up to 75  percent of fixed operating costs of busi-
nesses that accrued during the lockdown. Special guarantee schemes  were estab-
lished for exporting companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the 
tourism sector (Reisner, 2020). Furthermore, the obligation to file for insolvency 
in case of overindebtedness was temporarily suspended (Scherbaum Seebacher, 
2020). Relaxed tax regulations included the temporary deferral of personal and 
corporate income taxes and social security contributions as well as of value- added 
tax payments. Employers could apply for reimbursement of social security con-
tributions by the government if operations had to be suspended during the lock-
down (Reisner, 2020).
Beginning on March 13, 2020, the Federal Council in Switzerland announced 
several relief packages that amount to a total of CHF 73 billion (approximately 
10.4  percent of GDP; International Monetary Fund, 2020) as of this writing.
As in Germany and Austria, firms in Switzerland could claim benefits from a 
short- time working scheme. The scheme was extended several times. It was adapted 
to also cover on- call workers and some self- employed, and the application pro cess 
has been simplified (International Monetary Fund, 2020).
Furthermore, the Swiss support packages involved partial unemployment 
compensation and compensation for loss of earnings for the self- employed and 
for some employees afected by the lockdown. In par tic u lar, parents with caring 
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responsibilities resulting from school closures  were eligible for income support 
(Federal Department of Economic Afairs, Education and Research, 2020a; Fed-
eral Office of Public Health, 2020a).
Mea sures aimed at businesses included direct financial aid for severely afected 
firms (e.g., in the tourism sector), a loan guarantee program, and bridging loans 
for SMEs and start- ups and temporary interest- free deferral of social- security 
contribution payments (International Monetary Fund, 2020). The government 
also granted specific compensations for the railway and aviation- related busi-
nesses, as well as for cancelled events (Federal Department of Economic Afairs, 
Education and Research, 2020b, 2020c).
Explanation
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are textbook examples of federal countries, in 
par tic u lar when it comes to the organ ization of health and social care. However, 
in the specific context of the pandemic, federal structures came into play in very 
dif er ent ways across the three countries.
In Germany, responsibility for epidemic management fell largely to the six-
teen states as well as local public health authorities. Similarly, other policy areas 
that became relevant in the context of crisis management (e.g., education, regu-
lations for businesses)  were largely within state responsibility. Hence, especially 
in the early phase of the outbreak, Germany’s response was mostly character-
ized by heterogeneity across the individual states. The spread of the virus was 
rather uneven across the states, which led some state governors to press ahead 
in imposing mea sures, whereas  others remained hesitant (Schlette et al., 2020). 
State- by- state management was also foreseen by the German National Pandemic 
Plan, which was published in 2005. Considering the lack of historical pre ce dent 
for the current situation, however, it quickly became clear that more coordinated 
action would be required at least in some policy areas.
As the crisis evolved and case numbers began to increase all over Germany, the 
federal government began to weigh in. The power of the Ministry of Health was 
temporarily expanded on the basis of the “Act for protecting the public health in 
an epidemic situation of national importance,” which granted it competences in the 
provision of phar ma ceu ti cal and medical devices, as well as in the planning of the 
medical workforce (Greer et al., 2020). Furthermore, the so- called Small Corona 
Cabinet, consisting of the ministers of defense, finance, interior, foreign afairs, 
health, and the head of the Federal Chancellery, began to play a more central role 
during this phase (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). However, major decisions on 
mea sures such as contact restrictions and border closures still had to be taken in 
coordination with the states. In extensive and reportedly conflictual telephone con-
ferences, Chancellor Angela Merkel and the members of the Corona Cabinet dis-
cussed with state governors  until a certain degree of consensus was reached (Fried 
& Herrmann, 2020). When first reopening steps  were considered, state interests 
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regained weight, and the level of disagreement between state governors and the 
federal government increased. As a result, state governors again took the lead in 
lifting restrictions from early May onward.
In general, regional interests appeared to outweigh party interests in Ger-
many, as state governors heavi ly criticized mea sures taken by other governors 
from the same party, resulting in polyphony about correct behavioral mea sures in 
the pandemic. However, this controversy also was fueled by the current discus-
sion around Merkel’s succession, both as the leader of the Christian Demo cratic 
Union (CDU) and as candidate for chancellorship in the next elections. The party 
congress scheduled to agree on the new party leader had to be postponed  because 
of the outbreak. The crisis gave some conservative state governors the chance to 
strengthen their profiles and increase their stakes in the succession race. Before 
the outbreak, three men  were officially in the race for party leadership of the CDU 
and expected to  later on run for chancellor. Among them was Armin Laschet, 
state governor of North Rhine- Westphalia, whose candidacy was eventually sup-
ported by Health Minister Jens Spahn (Karnitschnig, 2020).  Because his state was 
among the first with large infection clusters, Laschet attempted to use the result-
ing media attention to his advantage, but seemed to have failed to convince the 
public during his public appearances. Instead, Markus Söder, state governor of 
Bavaria and leader of CDU’s  sister party, Christian Social Union (CSU), received 
wide praise for his  handling of the crisis and has since gained popularity all across 
Germany.  Because the two  sister parties, CDU and CSU, traditionally appoint a 
joint candidate for chancellorship, he has increasingly been discussed as the most 
promising candidate in that race (Rossmann, 2020).
In Austria, although competences on health  matters are distributed between 
the federation and the states, the field of public health— including the manage-
ment of epidemics and pandemics, according to the Epidemics Act— largely falls 
within the responsibility of the federation (Bussjaeger, 2020). From the beginning 
of the crisis, the chancellor and vice- chancellor as well as the ministers of health 
and the interior  were the central figures in the fight against the epidemic. The new 
government had just been sworn in in early January 2020  after several months of 
po liti cal turmoil and lack of po liti cal leadership on the national level. This made 
the conservative- green co ali tion particularly  eager to show resolve and unity in 
their crisis response (Czypionka et al., 2020).
The states  were clearly in a subordinate role. The system of indirect federal 
administration required them (and consequently the district authorities) to exe-
cute regulations passed at the federal level. In addition, it remained the task of 
the states to provide sufficient capacity in hospitals or with regard to testing and 
contact tracing (Bussjaeger, 2020). Furthermore, the states had the power to apply 
stricter mea sures in some areas, which allowed the states of Tyrol and Salzburg 
to impose curfew regulations on some municipalities that  were more heavi ly 
afected by the outbreak (Gamper, 2020).
Switzerland lies somewhere between Germany and Austria when it comes 
to the role of federalism in the COVID-19 crisis. The twenty- six cantons usually 
Greer, Scott L. Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of COVID-19.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11927713.
Downloaded on behalf of Unknown Institution
308  Coronavirus Politics
hold a large share of competences in vari ous policy fields, including health policy. 
Hence, in the early phase of the crisis, some cantons took action in de pen dently and 
imposed first containment mea sures. However, declaration of the extraordinary 
situation activated the Epidemics Act, which authorized the Federal Council to 
impose public health mea sures on a national level; this in turn shifted the weight 
of decision- making to the federal level (Belser et al., 2020; Mantwill et al., 2020).
As in Austria, the cantons  were responsible for the implementation and detailed 
configuration of mea sures while also organ izing and maintaining their cantonal 
health systems (Mantwill et al., 2020). Any restrictions imposed by cantons that 
went beyond the ones de cided upon on at the federal level  were at first regarded 
unlawful by the Federal Council. In par tic u lar, this became relevant when the can-
ton of Ticino required all nonessential manufacturing to close despite the fed-
eral decision to allow firms to continue production. However, continuous protest 
from several cantons led the Federal Council to change their stance in late March 
and allow cantons to make exceptions from the federal decree (Belser et al., 2020; 
Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020). In the transition phase  toward exit from lock-
down, an east- west rift arose, as the German- speaking cantons called for an end 
to the lockdown, whereas the more severely afected Italian- and French- speaking 
cantons preferred to keep restrictions in place (Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020). 
This controversy was among the reasons why the Federal Council de cided to leave 
the potential re introduction of lockdown mea sures to the cantons in case of a 
surge in infection rates.
 Whether a federalist or centralist organ ization of the pandemic response yields 
better results is a controversial question. Leaving the responsibility with regional 
authorities allows for testing dif er ent policy approaches and subsequently adopt-
ing the ones that prove to work best in other regions as well.  Because the virus 
spread unevenly and public health capacities varied by region, a regional response 
also gave states/cantons the chance to tailor mea sures to their individual situation 
(Schlette et al., 2020). Furthermore, regional governments could eventually be held 
accountable for their decisions (Sturm, 2020). In Germany, for example, policy 
makers and media stressed federalism as conditional for successfully providing tar-
geted responses and tailored prevention approaches (Esslinger, 2020; Hipp, 2020; 
Pergande, 2020; von Marschall, 2020). However, a federalist organ ization of the 
response also has substantial downsides. A lack of coordination and the resulting 
regional diferences in regulations can create undesired incentives (e.g., “tourism” 
to regions with stricter or less strict regulations) (Belser et al., 2020). It may also 
result in confusion and a lack of ac cep tance in the population, as it may be diffi-
cult to justify dif er ent responses in regions facing similar situations. Moreover, a 
centralist approach allows for fast responses  because it does not require extensive 
negotiations and coordination eforts. In addition, knowledge resources on how 
to fight a pandemic may also have considerable economies of scale. Accordingly, 
evaluations of the three countries’ outbreak responses with re spect to the role of 
federalism vary considerably (Belser et al., 2020; Bussjaeger, 2020; Gamper, 2020; 
Sturm, 2020).
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Another aspect that was handled very diferently across the three countries 
was communication. This refers to how the public was informed about the virus, 
the epidemiological situation and the mea sures taken, but also who the central 
figures in crisis management and communication  were. Hence, this aspect was 
interconnected with the role played by experts during the crisis.
In Germany, the role of information provision with re spect to the virus and the 
epidemiological situation—in part resulting from the polyphony from the po liti-
cal players in the beginning of the crisis— was to a  great part taken on by the RKI, 
which can be regarded Germany’s national public health institute, and Christian 
Drosten, director of the Institute for Virology at Charité Berlin. During the peak of 
the crisis, the RKI and its team of scientists created a steady flow of information by 
giving daily press conferences and publishing numerous risk assessments, strategy 
documents, response plans, surveillance reports, and technical guidelines (Wieler 
et al., 2020). Its recommendations and guidelines  were also  adopted by authorities 
in other countries (e.g., the Austrian Ministry of Health; Federal Ministry of Social 
Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2020a). In her press appearances 
related to COVID-19, Chancellor Merkel was usually flanked by Lothar Wieler, the 
head of the RKI. Christian Drosten, an expert on the SARS- CoV-1 virus, became 
one of the central figures in German media coverage on the virus. He had also 
been part of the team that developed the PCR diagnostic test and  later started a 
daily half- hour podcast with the broadcaster NDR. The charismatic scientist was 
dubbed by German media “the nation’s corona- explainer- in- chief” (Oltermann, 
2020a). Especially in the early phase of the pandemic, the RKI and Drosten  were 
the main advisors to the federal government and the populace in Germany. As the 
crisis evolved and impacts on other spheres than just health became apparent, 
the government extended its advisory group to include other disciplines (Schlette 
et al., 2020).
In comparison, the federal government of Germany played a less prominent 
role in crisis communication. Although some media viewed her as a leading fig-
ure in Eu rope’s fight against the pandemic, Chancellor Merkel, a scientist herself, 
in fact left the floor mainly to the medical experts. Her communication mainly 
consisted in calm explanations of the rationales  behind strict lockdown mea sures 
and appeals for solidarity, stressing the importance to uphold basic  human rights 
(Miller, 2020; Oltermann, 2020b). Especially during Merkel’s self- quarantine  after 
having been in contact with a doctor who tested positive, Health Minister Jens 
Spahn took on a bigger role in the government’s communication, which increased 
his popularity ratings. As a result, although he had previously announced not to 
run, he re- entered discussions around Merkel’s succession as party leader and 
chancellor candidate (Rossmann, 2020).
In Austria, the characteristics of crisis communication  were entirely dif er ent 
from Germany. The federal government was the central entity in decision- making 
and took the lead in nearly all aspects of communication. Chancellor Sebastian 
Kurz, Vice- Chancellor Werner Kogler, Health Minister Rudolf Anschober, and 
Interior Minister Karl Nehammer became the  faces of crisis management, as they 
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gave press conferences  under  great media fanfare almost on a daily basis at the 
peak of the crisis.
The Austrian government did to some extent rely on expert advice. The scien-
tific advisory board of the “Taskforce Corona” at the Ministry of Health included 
experts in vari ous medical fields. Furthermore, decisions  were aided by an agent- 
based simulation model of epidemic spread developed by a group of researchers 
at the Vienna University of Technology (Czypionka et al., 2020). However,  there 
was a lack of transparency regarding on which evidence decisions  were eventually 
based, and members of the advisory board began to publicly voice criticism. For 
example, experts had warned officials to take care of the procurement of sufficient 
protective equipment and test kits already in February, which would have pre-
vented shortages that occurred at the peak of the crisis. Moreover, several of the 
advisors in the “Taskforce Corona” had argued for a less strict and more targeted 
lockdown to contain social and economic impacts. However, in both instances, 
the government preferred not to follow the expert advice (Tóth, 2020).
Instead, leaked protocols revealed that Chancellor Kurz had, at the peak of 
the crisis, aimed for a strategy driven by fear (“Regierungsprotokoll” [“Govern-
ment Protocol”], 2020). His rhe toric was  shaped accordingly, very much in con-
trast to Merkel’s calming and unemotional demeanor. He repeatedly drew lines 
to the disturbing footage from Italian hospitals and famously said in an interview 
on March 30, 2020, that “soon, every one  will know someone who has died of the 
coronavirus,” although at that time daily new infections had already been decreas-
ing (“Regierungskommunikation” [“Government Communication”], 2020). This 
strategy was heavi ly criticized by the opposition. Furthermore, at multiple occa-
sions, it was implied in press conferences that certain activities  were prohibited, 
whereas this was in fact not in line with the  actual legislation (“Corona- Verbote,” 
2020). A lot of controversy also arose around the constitutionality of the mea-
sures taken. In the meantime, the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation, 
in  par tic u lar a ban on entering public spaces, was partly unlawful, which provoked 
even more criticism from the opposition (“VfGH” [“Constitutional Court”], 2020). 
Nevertheless, the government enjoyed high approval ratings throughout the crisis 
(Seidl, 2020).
In Switzerland, official crisis communication was also centered around the 
federal government, but not as exclusively as in Austria,  because the princi ple 
of collegiality is firmly rooted in its Swiss government. The government’s press 
conferences featured all seven ministers of the Federal Council, most prominently 
Interior Minister Alain Berset, who is also responsible for health  matters. As the 
mea sures taken  were not particularly harsh considering the country’s fast increase 
in infections, the government’s communication strategy was characterized by a 
mea sured tone appealing to the public’s rationality and solidarity (Wong Sak Hoi, 
2020). Berset’s promise from April 16, 2020, to act “as quickly as pos si ble and as 
slowly as necessary” became the mantra of the Swiss crisis management and was 
even printed on t- shirts to raise money for charity (“Minister’s Quote,” 2020).
Besides the federal government, the central figure in COVID-19– related com-
munication was Daniel Koch, who at the time was the head of the infectious dis-
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eases unit at the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) and was named the gov-
ernment’s COVID-19 delegate. Especially early on in the crisis, the civil servant 
with a medical background was praised by the press for his calm explanations of 
the epidemiological situation (Romy, 2020).
However, both the government and Koch also had to face some criticism, espe-
cially from epidemiological experts. In late January, Swiss epidemiologists pub-
lished a study on the transmission of SARS- CoV-2 (Riou & Althaus, 2020) and 
contacted the FOPH to ofer their help in preparing for a potential spread of the 
virus to Switzerland. Officials reportedly  were not interested in cooperation, and 
Koch instead made several statements about the virus not being more dangerous 
than the common flu. In late February, renowned scientists Marcel Salathé and 
Christian Althaus publicly criticized Koch and Berset for ignoring their advice and 
taking action too late, resulting in a severe shortage of masks at the outbreak of the 
crisis (S. Buehler et al., 2020). The Federal Council eventually de cided to set up the 
“Swiss National COVID-19 Science Task Force,” an expert advisory board that also 
includes Salathé and Althaus. The task force was, however, established as late as 
March 31 when national lockdown mea sures had already been in place for almost 
two weeks (S. Buehler et al., 2020; Mantwill et al., 2020).
The Swiss po liti cal system is famous for its tradition of debate and compro-
mise  because it constantly needs to coordinate the interests of its twenty- six can-
tons. With some exceptions— most notably the divide between eastern and west-
ern cantons about the lifting of lockdown measures— this spirit was also upheld 
during the COVID-19 crisis and the government’s response was mostly based on 
a broad po liti cal and regional consensus (Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020).
Conclusion
Although the three countries studied in this chapter are all prime examples of 
federalism, Austria and Switzerland showed a decisive, uniform public health 
response resulting from epidemic laws granting the central level pre ce dence 
 under such circumstances. By contrast, a lot of confusion arose when states in 
Germany engaged in a wide variety of interventions introduced at dif er ent times 
including even difering social distancing rules.  After a phase of more coordi-
nated policy action brought about by Chancellor Merkel, the question of how 
and when to lift lockdown became fuzzy again. At least in the beginning of the 
crisis and in the absence of unity in the po liti cal leadership, guidance primarily 
came from prominent scientists. The crisis also found the country in the midst of 
a strug gle for Angela Merkel’s succession and its protagonists as competitors in 
the fight against the virus. Politicians and the public strongly relied on the advice 
of the Robert Koch Institute and Christian Drosten, a world- leading expert on 
coronaviruses. By contrast, the Swiss federal government, with its strong tradi-
tion of collegiality, steered the country calmly despite a comparably higher death 
toll. A rift in the unan i mous response arose only on the question when to lift 
the lockdown mea sures, with Italian- and French- speaking cantons more cautious 
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than the German- speaking ones. The main media attention in Switzerland, often 
dubbed the “land of direct democracy,” centered around Daniel Koch, an expert 
civil servant, at least  until he became heavi ly criticized by prominent Swiss epide-
miologists. In Austria, the newly formed and novel (Conservative- Green) govern-
ment was bound to show strength and unity and implemented comparably harsh 
lockdown mea sures at an early stage. Prob ably reflective of this hegemony of poli-
tics over s cience, the main  protagonist on the media during the crisis was not a sci-
entist, but rather Chancellor Kurz. Close ties to Italy and disturbing footage from 
Italian intensive care units helped to garner support in the population, but  were 
likely also used strategically in government communication to instill a sense of fear.
Although all three countries managed to get through the crisis—or at least the 
first wave— relatively well, it remains to be seen what efects the dif er ent policy 
approaches  will have in the long run. As more and more background information 
on the dynamics and motivations  behind decisions made during the crisis comes 
to light, policy- makers  will be held accountable for their actions. No doubt the 
comparably good outcome has increased approval ratings for the ruling parties in 
all three countries. It remains to be seen, however,  whether this is a lasting efect 
or  whether some questionable actions (e.g., the disorderly lockdown and transi-
tion phases in Germany or the fear- based communication strategy in Austria)  will 
catch up with the ones in charge at the time. This and the question of constitution-
ality of some of the mea sures have likely also contributed to the growing number 
of “corona- deniers.” But even the majority of the population may eventually grow 
tired of mask- wearing and physical distancing. Together with other aspects like 
prevention in schools or concurrence of COVID-19 and influenza- like illnesses, 
 these challenges  will continue to put health systems and po liti cal leadership to the 
test in the face of resurging infection waves.
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